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The Case for Employee Ownership
in Overseas Operations of U.S.




Part of the success of the employee stock ownership plan(ESOP) concept
stems from the steady support it has received from both sides of the political
spectrum. Such political strangers as Walter Reuther and Ronald Reagan have
supported expanded employee ownership of employer stock.' The theoretical
background combines commitments to free enterprise and more equitable dis-
tribution of corporate ownership. Since 1973, when Senator Russell Long (D
Louisiana, retired) introduced the first of a continuing series of legislative ini-
tiatives favorable to ESOPs, the establishment of ESOPs has grown rapidly. By
the end of 1985 there were approximately 7,400 ESOPs covering some 7.4
million employees. 2 550 companies adopted ESOPs during 1985 alone. 3 Most
companies with significant employee ownership are medium to small sized, such
as Hallmark Cards or Eastern Airlines. 4 Larger companies such as ATT, GM, and
Exxon, however, have also distributed some shares to employees through
ESOPs.5
The extraordinary growth of ESOPs has generated interest in exporting the
*Member of the class of 1988, University of Michigan Law School.
1. The 1967 Economic Report of the President: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee,
90th Cong., 1st sess. 774 of part 4 (1967); Ronald Reagan, Speech to the American Legion,
reproduced in The Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1983, at 12.
2. PENS. PLAN GUIDE(CCH), No. 589, at 2 (July 3, 1986), from data compiled by the National
Center for Employee Ownership.
3. Id.
4. Eastern Airlines has 37,100 employees, and is 25 percent employee owned; Hallmark has
10,000 employees, and is 65 percent employee owned. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, newsletter of the
National Center for Employee Ownership, May/June 1986.
5. N. Kurland, The Future of the Multinational Corporation: Who Will Own It? Unpublished paper
for the International Congress on Technology and Technology Exchange, Pittsburgh, May 4, 1982
(available through the office of the MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD.).
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idea overseas. As part of the Carribbean Basin Initiative, President Reagan ap-
pointed a task force to study the prospects for ESOPs in Central America and the
Carribbean. The task force released a report with encouraging recommendations
to the President and Congress in October of 1986.6
This note presents the case for adapting ESOPs to the operations of U.S.
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Central America. It argues that the U.S. as
home country, host countries in Central America, MNEs, and their employees all
can benefit by cooperating to produce more democratic ownership and participa-
tion in MNEs through ESOPs. Widespread employee ownership would also
represent progress on some of the more general problems associated with under-
developed economies.
Part II of this note explains the relevance of using U.S. direct investment in
Central America as a starting point for encouraging employee ownership. Part III
describes the essential legal framework of the ESOP in the U.S., providing a
framework from which to adapt the ESOP to other countries. Part IV argues that
all parties paricipating in this form of expanded ownership will realize significant
short and long-term benefits, but points out some problems of transferring
ESOPs, a U.S. legal innovation, to different cultural and business environments.
Part V presents some of the legal and economic issues of adapting ESOPs, and
suggests two possibilities for implementing a program of expanded employee
ownership.
II. CENTRAL AMERICA AND U.S. MNEs
Although the idea of exporting the ESOP should by no means be limited, U.S.
direct investment in Central America makes a sensible starting point for several
reasons. First, the interest that both the Administration and Congress have ex-
pressed in democratic ownership raises excellent prospects for concrete foreign
policy legislation supporting the concept.7 Economic and political relations be-
tween the U.S. and Central America are critical for both parties, and their mutual
long term interests certainly lie in improving them.8
Second, although new investment and returns on existing investment have
fallen off high levels achieved during economic growth in the seventies, U.S.
investment in Latin America is still very important to the region. U.S. companies
6. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PROJECT ECONOMIC JUSTICE, HIGH ROAD TO ECONOMIC
JUSTICE (October 1986) [hereinafter Presidential Task Force], available through the Center for Eco-
nomic and Social Justice, Wash. D.C. The Task Force report is a thoughtful and comprehensive
analysis focusing on the possibilities for 'privatizing'economies dominated by inefficient state par-
ticipation by means of ESOPs and debt-for-equity swaps. Although many of the issues are the same,
this note concentrates on U.S. direct investments rather than domestic private or state owned firms in
Central America.
7. H.R. Con. Res. 31, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
8. See generally, W. LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (1984).
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remain the dominant foreign investors in Latin America as a whole, and arn a
high rate of return on investments there. 9 Moreover, while foreign firms continue
to compete to invest, the developing countries' positions on foreign investment
have shifted from stricter regulation to a more flexible policy as part of a competi-
tion to attract investment. 10 The business expertise and investment capital MNEs
can provide, combined with cheap labor and resources from the host country still
create a strong incentive to foreign investment. Especially now, given the re-
cessed economies and huge foreign debts of many developing nations, MNEs
take on added importance as engines for development and partial cures for
balance of payments ills.
Third, the great potential within MNEs to enhance development in Central
America has not been realized. The image of U.S. MNEs has been of powerful
and tightly managed companies whose presence benefits a concentrated group of
owners or host country elites. Relations between domestic labor, MNEs, and host
governments have often been combative and unproductive." Despite the long-
standing U.S. policy of development through foreign investment there has been
little improvment (if not actual deterioration) in the economic structure of Central
American countries. 12
Nevertheless, direct foreign investment is here to stay and does create some
substantial benefits.' 3 An International Labor Organization study concluded that
even capital intensive foreign investment provides significant employment effects
through business linkages. 14 In Latin America as a whole, direct employment
created by MNEs grew more rapidly in the years 1960-1977 than in any other
developing region. In Mexico MNEs are estimated to employ 20 to 30 percent of
manufacturing workers.15 Add to this the domestic labor employed in U.S.
agribusiness or service firms, and the great potential of equity distribution
through ESOPs is plain.
9. R. RAMSARAN, US INVESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBBEAN 101-3 (1985).
10. Levinson, Yanqui Come Back!, ACROSS THE BOARD, October 1986, at 22.
11. Some contributing examples are the United Fruit Company in Central America, and ITT and
the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies in Chile. They are perceived as having corrupted
local leaders and having interfered in host politics in an exercise of greed and exploitation. The point
is not to pass judgment on these allegations. Whether there is a factual basis for the worst images of
multinationals in Central America their relations could be improved and situations like those men-
tioned may be avoided.
12. See RAMSARAN, supra note 9, at 108-9, 178-87.
13. It is beyond the scope of this note to take sides in the academic debate on issues such as the net
balance of payments effect of foreign investment, net social costs or benefits. See, e.g., C. F
BERGSTEN ET AL., AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS, 354-368 (1978) [here-
inafter BERGSTEN]. The proposal of this note would shift the evaluation more in favor of multinational
corporations. BERGSTEN, id., or R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS (1977), outline
the broad issues in foreign direct investment.
14. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 56-76, 114 (1981).
15. Id. at 112-13.
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Finally, although labor unions are generally weak, suppressed, or controlled in
Central America there are incipient movements for worker ownership and par-
ticipation. One such movement is the solidarista phenomenon originated in Costa
Rica. Solidaristas are employee associations funded by employee contributions
and employer matching funds which create credit for employee purchases of
employer stock or other investments. Solidaristas now involve almost all U.S.
MNEs in Costa Rica and typically own 10-20 percent of employer stock.16 The
movement has spread to Guatemala and is present in Honduras and El Salvador,
totaling over 1000 associations covering more than 140,000 employees." MNEs
with some degree of employee ownership in Guatemala or Costa Rica include
Delmonte, Firestone, IBM, and Ramada Inns.18 These developments of worker
ownership and participation have occurred without any of the tax incentives
which favor ESOPs in the U.S. One can imagine the redoubled growth of dis-
tributed ownership if key elements of the favorable U.S. legal environment could
be duplicated or substituted in Central America.
III. ESOPs IN THE UNITED STATES
Lawyers working with ESOPs in the U.S. must be highly specialized. They
confront a maze of statutes and regulations involving the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the Department of Labor. Fortunately, the ESOP
can be reduced to some basic elements, and in streamlined form should be easily
adaptable to the various tax, labor, corporation, and foreign investment laws in
Central America.' 9 Set forth below is the essential structure of the leveraged
ESOP:20
1) A trust is set up for the employees and obtains a loan guaranteed by
the corporation to purchase presently owned employer securities or new
issues.
2) The stocks are held in a suspense account as collateral for the loan
until the loan is repaid from employer contributions or other sources.
Stocks are then freed and allocated to individual accounts according to
flexible formulas based on pay and/or service length, or per capita
methods.
16. Winsor, The Solidarista Movement: Labor Economics for Democracy, 9 THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY 177 (September 1986).
17. Id. at 177-78.
18. Id. at 180. See also J. Recinos et al., Statement of Purpose of the Solidarity Union of
Guatemala: The Philosophy and Objectives of the Business Executives, Corporate Owners and
Workers Solidarity Alliance of Guatemala (unpublished, available through the office of MICH Y.B.
OF INT'L LEGAL STUD.).
19. An excellent discussion of ESOPs, heavily relied on here, is WEHYER & KNOPFF, THE ESOP
(1986).
20. Id. at 29-35.
ESOPs 251
3) The account vests to employees, much as in any pension plan, accord-
ing to certain schedules. Dividends, if available, may be distributed imme-
diately or left in the individual account. Unallocated dividends may be used
to repay the loan or be invested.
4) Plan participants are entitled to begin receiving distribution of account
balances five years after termination of employment. Where stock is not a
registration type security (not readily tradeable) employees may "put" the
stock back to the employer for a fair price.
The essence of the ESOP is employee access to corporate credit which pro-
vides the opportunity for expanded ownership by employees without requiring
their financial contribution or risk.2' Although ESOPs make excellent comple-
ments to worker participation systems, the law does not require direct employee
participation in management. In large, publicly held corporations, allocated
ESOP stock must generally be voted as directed by the employees, and unallo-
cated stock must be voted in the interests of the employees by the plan admin-
istrator(s). 22 Where stock is not readily tradeable, voting rights must be passed
through to individual employees on major actions such as mergers or consolida-
tions, recapitalization, liquidation, dissolution, sale of substantial assets, or such
other actions requiring more than a majority as are enumerated in the bylaws.2 3
The employer may still structure the desired degree of employee input into
everyday business decisions. The percentage of outstanding stock held in an
ESOP can also be set by the employer. No minimums or maximums apply.24
However, an ESOP may only hold "qualifying" employer securities.25
ESOPs are implemented in the U.S. for many different reasons. Boards of
directors, of course, do not set them up solely out of a concern for economic
justice. ESOPs have been used to raise finances, as a defense to takeovers, or as a
favorable method for owners of close corporations to retire their interest. Em-
ployees desiring a chance to save their failing company have used ESOPs as a
leveraged buyout mechanism. 26 But the driving force behind the proliferation of
ESOPs is the favorable tax treatment begun in 1973. 27 Moreover, ESOPs have
remained relatively unscathed by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, unlike many other
21. ESOP creditors can only reach the following trust holdings: (1) loan collateral; (2) employer
contributions; and (3) earnings derived from (1) and (2). Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(5) (1986).
22. I.R.C. §§ 409(e), 4975(e)(7) (1987).
23. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(22), 409(e) (1987); WEHYER & KNOPFF, supra note 19, paragraph 4.15.
h 24. WEHYER & KNOPFI, supra note 19, at 238-40.
25. Defined in I.R.C. § 401(9) so as to protect the central purpose of the ESOP trust of investing in
employer stock for the benefit of the employees. Tleas. Reg. & 54.4975-11 (1986) gives a general
definition of ESOPs and their requirements.
26. WEHYER & KNOPFF, supra note 19, at 12-20.
27. Id., paragraphs 1.02, 1. 11. These passages describe the legislative history and some of the
important tax incentives of ESOPs.
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pension or profit sharing devices. The following is a list of some key tax advan-
tages for ESOPs:
1) The ESOP trust itself is tax exempt if a qualified ESOP is maintained
under ERISA. Employee accounts are untaxed until distributed. 28
2) Employer contributions to repay the loan are treated as a deductible
employee benefit expense. Other contributions may be deductible up to a
relatively high percentage of the total compensation of plan participants.2 9
3) Commercial lenders to an ESOP may deduct 50 percent of the interest
proceeds.30 Thus, loans to an ESOP may often be extended at below market
rates.
4) Sellers of stock to an ESOP may defer taxation of the proceeds by
reinvesting in the stock of another U.S. company.3
5) The corporation may deduct cash dividends paid to participants; there
is no "double taxation" of corporate profits at the corporate and individual
level. 32
To accompany these generous tax incentives, and other less crucial advantages
for ESOPs, the IRS, the Department of Labor, and the SEC combine to check
potential abuses and to ensure that ESOPs are maintained prudently and fairly for
the "exclusive benefit" of employees under the extensive regulation of ERISA. 33
Chiefly, to be eligible for any tax benefits an ESOP must represent a fair cross-
section of employees. It must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees in participation or benefits. 34
Naturally, the IRS can recover improperly obtained tax benefits if a plan has
become unqualified, but other enforcement mechanisms affect ESOPs more im-
mediately. Plan administrators or hothers who may be defined as ESOP fiduci-
aries are subject to a duty to protect the interests of employees. 35 Recent
developments in the courts have put serious emphasis on this duty. 36 There are
28. I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 4975(e)(7) (1987). Tax deferral for employees is given in §§ 402(9),
401(a)(23).
29. I.R.C. § 404(a) and (k) (1987).
30. I.R.C. § 133 (1987).
31. I.R.C. § 1042 (1987).
32. I.R.C. § 404(k) (1987).
33. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1987) covers qualified employee plans generally.
34. Participation requirements for qualified plans are given in I.R.C. §§ 401,410,411,415 (1987).
"Top heavy" plans - those which may discriminate in favor of more highly compensated employ-
ees - are governed by I.R.C. § 416 (1987).
35. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 3(21)(A), 404(a)(l)(B) and (C), 29
U.S.C. Ch. 18, (1982, Supp. 1986) [hereinafter ERISA]. Plan participants can sue for fiduciary
breaches, ERISA § 502(a)(2).
36. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), cert. den., 459 U.S. 1069 (1982),
aff d and modified, 680 F2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 754 F2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1985)
(breaches of duty in voting employee stock); see also, Suit Against Magazine Highlights Debate on
Valuing Employee Owned Companies, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1986, at 31, col. 4.
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detailed reporting requirements to the IRS and the Department of Labor3 7 and
potential registration requirements under the securities laws of 1933 and 1934.
Importantly, employees must receive an explanation of the plan and what their
participation means in language calculated to be understood. Employees also
have the right to some information on demand.38
These last basic regulations are probably more essential for adapting ESOPs to
multinational operations than the tax incentives. In other legal systems, different
tax or non-tax incentives may be packaged so as to replace the U.S. incentives,
but the fiduciary and reporting requirements should remain strong to protect the
employees. Nevertheless, it should not be difficult to simulate U.S. treatment of
ESOPs as pension or profit sharing plans or deferred compensation mechanisms
within the existing tax structure of other countries.
39
IV. BENEFITS FOR ALL PARTIES IN THE MNE SCENARIO
Adapting the ESOP to U.S. MNEs in Central America would serve the best
long term interests of everyone. There are costs associated with such a program,
but in a carefully designed plan the benefits should outweigh the costs for each
actor. This is best seen by viewing the possibilities from each perspective.
A. Host Countries
Before analyzing the host country benefits, it should be noted that the argu-
ment of benefits from employee ownership presumes a nationalistic definition of
the broad interests developing countries have vis-a-vis foreign investment. The
dual economies associated with developing countries present a potential political
problem because they can create a class of local elites whose interests are more
closely allied with those of the foreign investors. A concentrated, modernized
enclave may develop in the urban centers around capital investment while the
peripheral sectors languish. 40
37. The IRS requires registration documents from all plans, I.R.C. § 6057 (1987), and detailed
annual reports of the finances of the plan and its operations, I.R.C. § 6058(a) (1987). The Department
of Labor requires an updated plan description, ERISA § 101(b) and 104(a)(1)(B), annual reports,
ERISA § 103, and a copy of the summary plan description given employees, ERISA § 104(a)(1)(C).
Additionally, documents and reports filed with the IRS and DOL may have to be available for public
inspection, I.R.C. § 6104(a)(l)(B) and (C). Penalties may be assessed for failure to comply with
reporting and disclosure requirements, ERISA § 501.
38. Plan participants must have a summary description of the plan, ERISA § 104(a) and (b), and a
statement of their rights under the plan, ERISA § 104(c). On request, participants may obtain copies
of the plan documents such as the complete description or the trust agreement, ERISA § 104(b)(4).
39. This is taken up more fully in part V.
40. Prebisch, A Critique of Peripheral Capitalism, 9 CEPAL REVIEW (1st half), 60-76 (1976); J.
NELSON, AccEss T"o POWER 24-33 (1979) (analyzing the dual economy). The characteristic effects
of a modem developing sector vary with each country's political and economic history; Jackman,
Dependence on Foreign Investment, 34 WORLD Pou'TCS 175 (1982).
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Developing countries have recognized these issues and have begun to seek to
answer some of their specific needs, defined in more nationalistic terms, through
bargaining with foreign investors in each case. 4' Though there is tremendous
diversity in developing country characteristics, developing and developed coun-
tries have evidenced a reasonable consensus on the proper role of MNEs with
respect to host countries.4 2
With a host country perspective having been identified, the most salient benefit
of ESOPs for host countries would be some reduction in the concentration of
ownership and the staggering income disparities so prevalent in Central Ameri-
can economies. 43 Currently, only the government or wealthy elites- can afford
ownership in MNEs. Even where employees represent a small percentage of the
total labor force, as a new class of owners of income producing assets they would
represent a significant change in the structure of underdeveloped economies.
Furthermore, ownership expanding mechanisms such as the ESOP fit well
within the general theme of decreasing the income gap in Central American
economies. An ESOP is a method of distributing future wealth, not redistributing
currently held wealth, as in land reform programs so often stalled in Central
America. 44 As such, an ESOP program would be more palatable to the wealthy
elites. Similarly, since the program would be directed initially at MNEs, host
governments subject to criticisms of foreign domination and exploitation, yet in
great need of the capital and expertise MNEs can provide, would find the policy
more politically feasible. In addition to this softened perception of foreign invest-
ment, employee ownership could create a new political constituency for pro-
grams aimed at the income gap.
Host countries have also sought to extract maximum employment benefits from
MNEs. One goal is the creation of a larger, more skilled class of labor by means
of local hiring and training requirements for MNEs. MNEs have been willing to
cooperate with these requirements in the interest of efficient operations in the
local business environment.45 Access to ownership for these employees would
create more ties to the host economy, serving the preference for integrated
development over MNE enclaves. The pension and profit sharing elements of an
ESOP are consonant with the goal of improving the quality of the labor force.
To the extent that a company is successful and an ESOP prospers, two benefits
may be realized. ESOPs could help supply savings for investment in more
employer securities or in other outlets, much as solidaristas do. 46 Gains in work-
41. BERGSTEN, supra note 13, at 369-81.
42. U.N. CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (draft), U.N. Doc E/
C. 10/1982/6 of June 5, 1982, Annex. at 192 [hereinafter U.N. CODE].
43. During 1960-1975, a period of relatively high GNP growth, income distribution worsened in
Latin American countries. RAMSARAN, supra note 9, at 27.
44. For one country's case, see E. BALOYRA, EL SALVADOR IN TRANSITION, 102-04,138-9
(1982).
45. I.L.O, supra note 14, at 113.
46. Winsor, supra note 16, at 181.
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ers' income would help support strong consumer demand, which is vital to
further development.
Another route to integrating and controlling foreign investment is a local
ownership requirement. The most well known example is probably Mexico's
widely emulated "mexicanization law," requiring majority local ownership in
most foreign direct investments. 47 The purpose of local ownership is to prevent
de-nationalization of the economy and ensure that local interests are represented
in MNEs. These goals have often been frustrated because, as noted earlier, local
owners may have a closer allegiance to the company's interest than the national
interest. 48 Or, where local owners might represent countervailing interests to the
MNEs worldwide profit motive, companies have evaded the law through sham
stockholders or other means. 49
Host countries could improve the performance of local ownership require-
ments by allowing foreign investors to satisfy them with effective ESOPs.
Worker participation in everyday management could still be at the discretion of
the company, although it should be encouraged. Such employee owned stock,
however, makes the company accountable to the workers on major issues such as
substantial sales of assets, liquidation, or merger by means of the fiduciary duty
to stockholders or employee voting rights. Without effective unions or plant-
closing legislation, a shutdown or liquidation by an MNE without warning can
have disastrous effects on the employees and local community. An ESOP would
at least ensure that employee interests are a factor, and if it held a substantial
portion of stock, the employees might be able to veto unfavorable proposals.
Finally, if reporting requirements similar to those imposed under U.S. law were
adopted, host countries could more easily police local ownership.
B. United States as Home Country
The worldwide activities of U.S. corporations have important effects on trade
policy, foreign relations, and ultimately the domestic economy. Yet U.S. re-
sponse to these forces has lagged considerably behind their appearance. U.S.
multinationals have been encouraged to carry out their investments without being
accountable on many issues to the home country. U.S. policy has not presented a
coherent treatment, and has mainly been confined to taxation and protection of
U.S. investments.5 0 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act5' is one attempt to influ-
47. Ley Para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera, 317 D.O. 5,
March 9, 1973 (Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment).
48. Vernon, supra note 13, at 168-70.
49. R. Tancer, Regulating Foreign Investment in the Seventies: The Mexican Approach, in THE
FUTURE OF MEXICO, 197-206 (Kaslow ed. 1976).
50. BERGSTEN, supra note 13, at 22-31. The authors also discuss the history of U.S. policy, and
conclude that more careful consideration of foreign investment effects on the security and welfare
interests of the U.S. and host countries is called for. Id. at 309-14.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 (1982). This act penalizes certain illicit activities of U.S.
corporations abroad, including their employees and agents, such as bribing government officials.
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ence MNE activity, but the U.S. needs to become more involved in the invest-
ment process.
A significant step toward greater involvement would be active encouragement
of employee ownership of U.S. companies abroad. Such a program would dem-
onstrate real commitment to the longstanding U.S. development rhetoric of free
enterprise and democratic principles. Past policy and the present Carribbean
Basin Initiative have been justifiably criticized for placing development issues in
the context of East-West relations and failing to recognize the need for real
structural reforms in the economies and attention to basic needs. The benefits of
U.S. style modernization have not trickled down.
52
Overall, developing countries have perceived similar economic policies thrust
on them by the member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and international financial institutions as paternalistic
and somewhat hypocritical. 53 Putting its own house in order first by encouraging
ESOPs in MNEs abroad, the U.S. could begin to remedy policy failures and lost
credibility.
Charles Kindleberger pointed out that the challenges of the global economy
call for leadership and recognition of long-term interests. While the U.S. is no
longer the dominant economy, he sees it as the best choice to assume that
leadership." With this particular program of encouraging employee ownership
the U.S. might provide an example of sound foreign policy for other developed
countries.
The debt crisis, East-West security issues, and the mutual need for strong and
stable trading partners have created a special interdependence between the U.S.
and Central American nations. Yet few would describe Central America as a
shining example of U.S. foreign policy. For instance, on the mainland as well as
in the Carribbean there have been a series of heavy handed and belated attempts
at quick military solutions to problems with deeper roots: Guatemala (1954),
Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), and currently
Nicaragua and El Salvador. ESOPs in U.S. MNEs could be part of a more patient
alternative policy with greater respect for self-determined development in Central
America. Steps the U.S. might undertake to promote this are discussed in Part V.
C. MNEs
Companies establishing ESOPs would be giving up some managerial control
and profits, while incurring the administrative costs of setting up and maintaining
52. RAMSARAN, supra note 9, at 100, 108, 178-87.
53. R. HANSEN, BEYOND THE NoRmH-SouTH STALEMATE, 7-8,27,47-52 (1979). Hansen ana-
lyzes developed and developing country relations in the context of the world political system.
54. Kindleberger, Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy, 25(2) Ir'l. STUD.
Q. 242 (1981).
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a qualified plan. These disadvantages must be partly overcome by incentives such
as those under U.S. tax law.5 5 However, an ESOP can buy a multinational enough
significant benefits, aside from those which incentives give, to make it a produc-
tive investment. In addition to the finances raised from a sale of stock, the
company can achieve better labor relations through more involved, satisfied and
productive workers, and improved status with host countries.
Since the success of an ESOP depends on profits, the participating employees
have a real stake in the success of the company. In the U.S. there have been
spectacular examples of productivity and profitability gains after ESOPs with
substantial shares were instituted. 56 They also have the potential of improving
labor relations and worker satisfaction as solidaristas do.57 In the U.S., managers
often cite the motivation of employees as a primary rationale for ESOPs. 58 These
could be tremendously significant benefits to MNEs.
Two cautionary notes are in order, however. First, the overall evidence for
increased productivity and worker satisfaction is somewhat inconclusive. Some
studies support these benefits in the context of employee ownership.5 9 Other
studies have found no such connection but suggest that the missing variable may
be a degree of worker participation in management decisions, or a more than
trivial degree of ownership. 60
Second, there should be a close examination of the differences in culture and
labor structure. A simple transfer of worker ownership or participation models
developed in one country to a different country may not result in any of the same
benefits. 6' Specifically, the U.S. labor force is generally more educated and more
sophisticated about employee benefits than are the labor forces of Central Amer-
ica. Motivation and satisfaction in these workers may depend partly on the
company's ability to fully disclose to the rank and file employees what the ESOP
means for them and how it works. Thus, the extensive disclosure requirements in
U.S. law for the education and protection of employees take on added signifi-
cance in the MNE setting.
55. They need not necessarily be tax incentives; waivers of certain restrictions on foreign invest-
ment or trade incentives could be just as effective.
56. Presidential Task Force, supra note 6, at 72-4.
57. Winsor, supra note 16, at 181.
58. WEHYER & KNOPFF, supra note 19, at 16.
59. ESOP companies in similar sized firms and industries are one and a half times more profitable
than other firms. M. Quarri, Employee Ownership and Corporate Performance, unpublished study
available through the National Center for Employee Ownership (1986). Worker satisfaction and
productivity are related to ESOP contributions and the commitment of the company to worker
ownership. Employee Ownership, unpublished study by the University of Michigan Survey Research
Center (1980).
60. Sockell, Attitudes, Behaviors, and Employee Ownership, 24(1) INDus. REL. 130 (1985); Long,
Worker Ownership and Job Attitudes, 21 INDoUS. REL. 196 (1984).
61, Levitan & Werneke, Worker Participation and Productivity Change, 28 MoNTHLY LAB. REV.
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The response of Central American labor to employee ownership diminishes
these two concerns somewhat. The solidarista movement is one indication of an
environment ripe for modified ESOPs. In particular, there is the dramatic exam-
ple of La Perla coffee plantation in Guatemala. Beset by guerillas and on the
brink of failure, the owners set up an ESOP under the auspices of a solidarista
association. In 1984, after the first allocations of shares (40 percent ownership)
production increased nearly two-fold, and prospects for the future are excellent.
Worker ownership is a powerful enough idea that some of the guerillas have
defected to the plantation, and plantation workers have taken up arms to defend
their interests. 62
An additional benefit of local ownership, especially of a kind making a unique
contribution like an ESOP, is the harmonization of relations with the government
and reduction of risks of unfavorable reactions to foreign investment. 63 The effort
multinationals spend on political risk evaluation and the growth of overseas
investment insurance indicate that unpredictable host country policies are one of
the greatest concerns of MNEs. 6 In most circumstances host countries should be
more reluctant to expropriate a multinational with a significant element of local
ownership through an ESOP. Even less severe policies affecting the profitability
of an MNE would damage the interests of domestic employee owners.
In the actual event of expropriation and compensation proceedings, contribu-
tions to the host country made through an ESOP could result in more favorable
valuations of the investment. If MNEs can present a less clearly foreign intrusion
into their hosts overall-if they are seen as less of a de-nationalization or exploi-
tation threat-their investments should receive more favorable treatment. Finally,
to the degree that MNEs are able to accomplish these objectives they may reduce
their overseas investment insurance costs.
Elsewhere in the Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies, Kojo
Yelpaala has described the internalization theory of why MNEs invest abroad. He
argues that legislation targeting MNEs must take account of the desire of MNEs
to obtain control over all factors affecting marketing and production in their
business. With such control, MNEs can shift aspects of their operations among
countries to maintain a smooth business despite the vagaries of the world econ-
omy or host government policies creating "market imperfections. 65 For exam-
ple, if the costs of labor go up in one country, or even the predictability of those
62. England, Peasants Fight and Buy Stock to Save Beleaguered Plantation, INSIGHT (June 16,
1986) at 33, col. 1, reprinted in Presidential Task Force, supra note 6, appendix D.
63. See M. BROOKE & H. L. REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
235-240 (1978).
64. See M. Levinson, Where's the Next Revolution, ACROSS THE BOARD, Jan. 1986, at 40.
65. Yelpaala, The Impact of Industrial Legislation on the Behavior of Multinational Enterprises
and Labor in the Industrializing Countries of East and Southeast Asia, 6 MICH.Y.B. INT'L LEGAL
STUD. 383, 395-6 (1986). See also, P. BUCKLEY AND M. CASSON, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 9-14 (1985).
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costs, a multinational may respond by shifting that factor of production
elsewhere.
It follows that local ownership, especially in an ESOP, would put some outer
limits on the flexibility MNEs enjoy. Indeed, this is part of the advantage to the
other actors. Nevertheless, there is a trend toward greater local ownership.66
ESOPs should not affect this trend, nor deter investment for the following rea-
sons. An MNE will still retain control over the costs associated with an ESOP.
Unlike a minimum wage law, or employment insurance, or even a defined benefit
pension plan, ESOPs do not raise the fixed costs of labor. The cost is variable
aside from the minor administrative expenses. There is no minimum contribution
requirement. If in one year there are no profits, there need not be contributions.
Or if in another year the company needs capital for expansion, it need not
contribute. 67
In summary, MNEs with ownership by local employees will be giving up some
control. But the internalization theory supports the view that MNEs would gener-
ally trade such control for the benefits of harmonious relations with the host
country and labor force.
D. Local Workers
The rank and file employees of MNEs are often left out of the development
equation. Or worse, they are subjected to repression of collective action or wage
freezes in the interests of industrialization. 68 The benefits of ownership, share-
holder rights, and worker satisfaction have already been noted in the context of
host country and MNE interests. In the long run, ESOP beneficiaries might not
be the only workers aided by the process. A growing class of more sophisticated
employee-owners might obtain political power to bargain for the welfare of other
workers, especially those in the poor agricultural sector. Prospects for this,
however, would vary greatly with the local political structure. 69
An episode in Honduras illustrates the more concrete significance of employ-
ees' equity in their company. A Central American ladies garment manufacturer
66. BROOKE & REMMERS, supra note 62, at 235-40. This passage also treats some of the variables
affecting the costs of local ownership.
67. The lack of a contribution requirement is at once a strength and a weakness of this proposal. If
an ESOP fails to succeed for lack of profits or whatever reason, the employees are left with nothing
except contributions they may have made or vested benefits. For a company not realizing enough
profits, default on the loan would probably mean that the secured creditor becomes the stock owner.
Incentives for the maintenance of ESOPs by profitable companies can ensure that plan failure is not a
problem in practice.
68. See, e.g., B. KADAR, PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 195, 212-13
(1980); Villegas, The Philippine Labor Code and Industrial Workers, 44 (nos 1-4) PHIL. Soc. Scl.
AND HUMANITIES REv. 75 (1980).
69. NELSON, supra note 39, at 125-67, 318-26. This is an in-depth analysis of the political
prospects for urban lower classes in developing countries.
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known for an anti-labor posture suddenly shut down and abandoned a factory
employing some 289 Honduran women. This followed a history of similar ac-
tions elsewhere in Central America where there was the prospect of dealing with
organizing labor interests. Those employees applied their equity in the company
to obtain the machinery and other productive assets. They were able to establish a
worker-managed enterprise jointly with the Honduran Port Authority which man-
ages the free trade zone. For many of the women this venture has offset some of
the devastation of lost jobs where there are few other employment prospects. The
cooperative faces some difficulties, international marketing for example, but
these women now have an opportunity to take charge of their fate. 70
In conclusion, ESOPs should not be construed as a substitute for unions,
unemployment insurance, job safety laws, or other worker benefits which may be
necessary and feasible. Even in developing countries which have laws protecting
labor, companies are often able to evade them. 71 Rather, employee ownership
should be a component of an overall drive to improve the status of labor in
developing countries. The determination and ability of the Honduran women
illustrates the great potential for employee ownership to benefit labor.
E. The International Perspective
Various country factions still debate some aspects of the proper treatment of
MNEs, notably the applicable law for compensation of expropriated assets. Even
so, the ESOP proposal outlined here coincides with many of the settled objec-
tives for MNEs expressed in the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corpo-
rations. The Code calls for cooperation between host countries and MNEs to
maximize "their contributions to the development process" and establish "mutu-
ally beneficial relations."72 On the issue of ownership the Code provides that:
"RTansnational corporations shall/should co-operate with Governments and na-
tionals of the countries in which they operate in the implementation of national
objectives for local equity participation and for the effective exercise of control by
local partners .... ,,73
Furthermore, the Code provides that MNEs should enhance the effective par-
ticipation of local personnel in decision-making and contribute to the economic
and social development of the host.7 4 Additionally, the Code describes disclosure
requirements of financial data and operations to the host government and labor
more extensive than those that might be required for an ESOP.75 Therefore,
70. Street, Multinationals Square Off Against Central American Workers, Bus AND SOC'Y REV.,
wntr., 1985 at 45-49.
71. NELSON, supra note 39, at 31-33.
72. U.N. CODE, supra note 41, paragraph 9 at 194.
73. Id., paragraph 23, at 196.
74. Id., paragraphs 21, 24, at 196.
75. Id., paragraphs 44, 45, at 200-01. Seehalso, R. BLANPLAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES (1983)
on the developed countries' policies and practices with respect to MNEs and their labor.
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expanded employee ownership in MNEs should draw support throughout the
international community.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Sweeping national legislation of the type in the U.S. favoring ESOPs is unlikely
in Central American nations until a few successful examples are carried out.
Currently, numerous factors would affect the feasibility of implementation and
structure of the plan in any given case. Even the new U.S. corporate tax rates
enacted in 1986 may affect foreign investment decisions.7 6 Moreover, the legal
systems of Central America, though based on civil law, are by no means homoge-
neous. Varying tax, labor, corporate, or foreign investment laws will all raise
different considerations with respect to ESOP type mechanisms. A consideration
of all these factors is beyond the scope of this note. Ultimately, the relative
bargaining powers of the home country, the host country, and the MNE would
determine the outcome in each case as they each strive to tailor the ESOP to the
local environment and to their best advantage.7 7 Therefore, this section is limited
to pointing out some more general problems and possibilities for implementation.
A. Preliminary Considerations
A basic requirement for setting up a successful ESOP is that there be taxable
profits. A review of the recessed economies in Central America could lead one to
conclude that MNEs are not doing well enough to consider new proposals based
on profits. 78 Closer examination reveals that U.S. firms continue to realize
healthy returns on investment in Central America, especially in manufacturing. 79
Despite the strong dollar, many U.S. multinationals are realizing substantial
profits abroad, including profits from Latin America. 8°
A second less significant issue is the lack of the beneficial ownership of
property concept in civil law countries. If a trust for employees cannot be worked
into the local law then the gradual steps of ownership in an ESOP (suspense
account, allocation, vesting, distribution) and their attendant legal rights will
have to be replaced by some other legal technique. This is not an insurmountable
obstacle. Civil law countries have developed contractual or corporate means of
accomplishing similar results."1
76. Tax Bill May Force New Practices Abroad, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1986, at 18, col. 1.
77. An interesting statistical study of bargaining power between host countries and MNEs is found
in LeCraw, Bargaining Power, Ownership, and Profitability of Transnational Corporations in Devel-
oping Countries, 15 J. OF INT'L Bus. STUD. 27 (1984).
78. Cf, e.g., Baird, Survival Strategies for Latin America, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR Oct., 1983,
283-91.
79. RAmsARAN, supra note 9, at 102-3.
80. Pearson, Strong Dollar or No, There's Money to be Made Abroad, BusINEss WEEK, March
22, 1985, at 155-62.
81. Interview with Peter Behrens, Professor of Law, Max Planck Institut, Hamburg, in Ann Arbor
(March 10, 1987).
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B. United States Options
The simplest method of introducing ESOPs to Central America would be to
extend the coverage of U.S. qualified plans to affiliates in Central America. For
U.S. citizens working in branch offices, divisions or subsidiaries, the affiliated
employer test of ERISA may require this coverage to qualify the parent com-
pany's plan. 82 A U.S. plan may then be used to cover the foreign employees as
well without being disqualified. 83 With the U.S. having effectively subsidized the
costs of regulating the plan, it only remains to the host country to coordinate its
tax treatment of the plan. For instance, company contributions to the plan should
be deductible but not taxed as income to the employees until actually received.
Short of extending U.S. plan coverage, there are other important options for
U.S. encouragement of employee ownership. First, trade policies could target
MNEs exporting to the U.S. and having significant employee equity for preferen-
tial treatment. Tariffs, quotas, or other trade barriers should be relaxed in such
circumstances. Second, banks extending loans to ESOPs overseas should receive
the 50 percent interest earning exclusion they have for U.S. plans. Third, multi-
lateral lending institutions in which the U.S. participates, such as the Inter-
American Development Bank, should provide loans to ESOPs or help to guaran-
tee private loans to ESOPs. 4 Finally, repatriated profits from MNEs with ESOPs
might be extended the same tax treatment as if the companies were in the U.S.
C. Host Country Options
Developing countries should concentrate initially on the companies against
which they have the greatest bargaining power, preferably in the export sector
where foreign investment is concentrated. One method of duplicating the key
protections in U.S. law and extending comparable tax incentives would be by
contract. The multinational, probably already experienced in U.S. employee
benefits law, would agree to maintain a qualified plan on the basis of streamlined
U.S. law incorporated into the contract. The host country would promise to
waive or alter local laws which could weigh against the plan and provide any
other necessary incentives. Failure to maintain the plan, except for excusable
economic reasons, would be a breach of the contract and entitle either the
government or the employees to sue for restitution or other damages. Back taxes
could be one measure of damages.
There are precedents for these kind of special legal arrangements with MNEs
82. I.R.C. § 414 (1987).
83. I.R.C. §§ 406,407,414 (1987). There is a brief but thorough discussion of this in Klein, Use of
U.S. Qualified Retirement Plans Outside the U.S., 12 l1m'L TAX J. 63 (1986). Under this scheme
foreign employees could obtain ownership of parent company stock: this would be an interesting and
dramatic development in the matter of international securities.
84. Presidential Task Force, supra note 6, 79-87, makes these recommendations and others.
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in the form of export processing zones, also called offshore manufacturing, or
free trade areas. The controversial maquiladoras in Mexico are a notable example
of this phenomenon. Typically, the host country makes certain requirements of
companies wishing to export in the zone such as setting a high percentage of
exported products, or repatriating a low percentage of profits. The firm gains a
sort of legal bubble in which to operate free of export duties or regulations
normally applied to foreign investment."5 Offshore business can earn foreign
currency and provide something of a quick fix for balance of payments troubles.
More benefits along the lines of integrated development objectives could be
obtained by including ESOPs in the legal package.
A brief look at Mexican tax laws demonstrates some of the adaptations host
countries may make especially for ESOPs. Mexico requires employers to con-
tribute eight percent of before tax profits to employees. Those contributions are
non-deductible, and taxed to the recipient.8 6 However, contributions to employee
"savings funds" are nontaxable to the employee and deductible by the employer
up to 13 percent of salary.87 An ESOP could be worked into this structure by
treating it as a savings fund for the employees and retaining the profit sharing
requirement, while allowing an income tax deduction for contributed profits.
Mexico also has a withholding tax of 55 percent on dividends as an advance
payment of income tax88 that could be waived for dividends paid into the ESOP
Although, as mentioned, there may also be labor laws or corporate laws which
affect the adaptation of the ESOP in Mexico or in other countries, the basic ESOP
is a flexible instrument that lends itself to adaptation in many legal systems. 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The establishment of a few successful ESOPs in Central America would be but
a small step in gradual and steady progress toward the resolution of problems
discussed throughout this note. Yet the potential of the concept is broad. Em-
ployee ownership could expand to the MNEs of other host countries or to domes-
tic firms. Consider the rest of Latin America - especially Argentina and Brazil,
laden with foreign investment - and the developing world. Even Israel and the
United Kingdom have shown interest in employee ownership. 9°
85. Moreno, Mexican Law on In-Bond Processing Plants, in 1 DOING BusiNEss IN MEXICO Ch.
33, (Matthew Bender, 1987). See generally, A. BASILE & D. GERMIDIS, INVESTING IN FREE EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONES (OECD Development Centre Studies 1984).
86. 3 INT'L TAX AND Bus. SERVICE (Deloitte, Haskins and Sells), Mexico paragraph 7.18 at 30
(1986).
87. Id., paragraph 10.07 at 38.
88. Id., paragraph 5.03 at 19.
89. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Norm Kurland of Equity
Expansion International in the analysis of the essential requirements for adapting the ESOP.
90. ESOP Report, ESOP Association, Nov/Dec 1985, at 3.
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There are still pressing issues with respect to MNEs which ESOPs would not
affect: these include transfer pricing and appropriate technologies or products for
underdeveloped economies. Basic human needs, sovereign debt, declining terms
of trade, and dependence on primary exports will still trouble developing coun-
tries. These distressing issues should not diminish the potential accomplishments
of an expanded ownership program. Dealing with foreign investment need not be
a zero-sum game. As a cooperative and mutually beneficial approach, ESOPs
would be likely to have lasting effects. Perhaps success in this area could create
the optimism and cooperation needed to effectively address other development
problems.
